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Rule 408: Maintaining the Shield for Negotiation in
Federal and Bankruptcy Courts
1. INTRODUCTION
Rule 408 bans the introduction at trial of statements or conduct
made during compromise or settlement negotiations.' Prior to the
enactment of the rule, the common law proscribed only admissions of
proposed or accepted compromises2 and did not include admissions of
fact made in the course of compromise negotiations.3
In 1973, the Supreme Court, influenced by policy considerations for
encouraging disclosure during settlement, promulgated rule 408.4
The rule was passed, as amended, by Congress in 1975.5
1. The rule in its entirety is as follows:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting
or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising
or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity
or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or
its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotia-
tions is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of
any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the
course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion
when the evidence is offered for another purposes, such as proving bias or
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
FED. R. EVID. 408.
2. See, e.g., West v. Smith, 101 U.S. 263, 271-73 (1979) (proposed or accepted com-
promise is not evidence of an admission and is therefore irrelevant); Insurance Cos. v.
Weides, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 375, 381 (1872) (evidence of a compromise, proposed or ac-
cepted, is not an admission of amount of debt). See also J. WIGMORE, A STUDENT'S
TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 202 (1935). An offer by the opponent ... is not
evidence of an admission that the claim is valid; for experience shows that such an of-
fer may proceed ... merely from the desire to avoid tedious and expensive litigation,
and may not signify any consciousness of liability." Id.
3. Admissions of fact were admissible unless they were espoused hypothetically
or "stated to be 'without prejudice,' or so connected with the offer as to be inseparable
from it." 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. MERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 408-[01], at 408-10
(1988) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE]. This exception for factual admissions
caused concern with the advisory committee because its effect was to hamper commu-
nication and thus limit the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 408-3.
4. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
226-27 (1973).
5. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1933 (1985). The final en-
actment by Congress slightly deviates from the rule as promulgated by the Supreme
Court. The only changes were the addition of a sentence stating that the "rule does
not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is
presented in the course of compromise negotiations," and the addition of the word
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Rule 408, as enacted, contains many exceptions and loopholes
which potentially limit its applications. The rule was intended to cre-
ate an intricate balance between the desire to include all relevant evi-
dence and the policy to encourage settlement of disputes. In the
bankruptcy courts, this balance is particularly hard to achieve be-
cause the bankruptcy forum is traditionally known for its leniency in
hearing all appropriate evidence to settle the dispute. Conversely,
the bankruptcy forum is also known for its aggressive promotion of
dispute resolution through settlement or compromise.
However, rule 408 was designed to aid in the compromise and set-
tlement of disputes. The advisory committee itself states that the ex-
clusion is based on irrelevance and "promotion of the public policy
favoring... compromise and settlement .... "6 This justification has
been clearly espoused by the courts as well. In a Southern District of
New York bankruptcy case, Judge Brieant stated that "[t]he public
policy... behind [rule 408] is to encourage settlement discussions. If
settlement discussions are later to be brought in question in the con-
text of litigation, the free exchange of ideas between lawyers neces-
sary to adjust and compromise disputes would be severely chilled." 7
Similarly, McCormick notes that, under a restrictive reading of rule
408, an attorney who is contemplating a settlement offer would con-
sider the possible damage which could result if such an offer is not
accepted but is later used against him at trial. This may influence
his decision as to whether he should proceed with the offer.8
The above interests, coupled with the existing congestion of court
dockets, mandates a liberal interpretation of rule 408 so as to foster
settlement discussions. Full disclosure is crucial during the settle-
ment process. Without it, parties will not entertain meaningful dis-
cussion, and far more potentially settled cases will proceed to a
possibly unnecessary trial. However, courts are presently in disagree-
ment as to the intended scope of the rule. Although the above inter-
ests play a part, so does the policy of including all relevant evidence.
Thus, at present, the direction of rule 408 remains unclear.
This comment will first discuss the policies behind rule 408. Next,
'also' between 'rule' and 'does' in the final sentence. This amendment was to ensure
that a party could not "immunize from admissibility documents otherwise discoverable
merely by offering them in a compromise negotiation." S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 10 (1974). See WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 408-2 to 408-8; 23 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5301, at 160-63 (1980)
[hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE] (analysis of extensive controversies and concerns
prior to final enactment).
6. FED. R. EVID 408 advisory committee's note.
7. Although District Court Judge Brieant's statements were originally contained
in an unreported opinion, they were later reiterated in the related case of In re
Silverman, 13 Bankr. 270, 272 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
8. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 76, at 158 (1954) (cited in WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE,
supra note 3, at 408-20 n.8).
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an analysis of the rule's application in the courts will be undertaken,
focusing on those courts furthering a broad interpretation and noting
the exceptions used to admit negotiation evidence under a more re-
strictive approach. Finally, a summary of the rule as it stands in the
federal courts today will emphasize whether the optimum balance
between admissibility of evidence and encouragement of dispute reso-
lution is being properly achieved.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE RULE
At least three justifications support excluding offers of compromise
at trial. The oldest justification and the common law view is that an
offer of compromise is irrelevant because the offer ". . . implies
merely a desire for peace, not a concession of wrong done." 9 This
theory emphasized that an offer is not akin to an admission, since
benefits such as avoidance of litigation expense may justify the offer
even if the offeror truly believes there is no liability. Thus, only ex-
press admissions under this theory are admissible.1O
This theory, known as Wigmore's relevance theory, has been se-
verely criticized and in fact, has been impliedly rejected by rule 408.
The criticisms center around the premise that a defendant offering to
pay nine-tenths of an asserted claim is highly unlikely to believe the
claim to be unfounded." Additionally, it requires the court to under-
take an analysis of the offeror's intent in order to determine whether
he believes in his liability. Under the modern rule of relevance, evi-
dence need only have "any tendency to make the existence of any
fact ... more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."12 An offer of compromise clearly meets this liberal test.
A second rationale, originating from England, is the contract the-
ory whereby the magic words "without prejudice" are used to convey
that the offer is confidential. 13 Letters of compromise not containing
these words are admissible. This theory has generally been dis-
9. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1061, at 36 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
10. Id. at 39. "What is important is the form of the statement, whether it is ex-
plicit and absolute." Id. at 41 (emphasis in original).
11. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 76, at 158 (1954); accord MORGAN, BASIC
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 210-11 (1962). See also FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's
note ("The validity of this position will vary as the amount of the offer varies in rela-
tion to the size of the claim.").
12. FED. R. EVID. 401.
13. FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 5, at 169; WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 3,
at 408-21. See generally Coote, "Without Prejudice" Communication-Another Red
Light for Practitioners, 1979 N.Z.L.J. 87 (1979).
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counted by courts of the United States14 as being too mechanical and
thus a trap for the unwary. However, inclusion of the "without prej-
udice" language is often used as an additional guarantee that the evi-
dence will be inadmissible.15
The final and most recent justification claims that the exclusionary
rule is a rule of privilege.16 This rationale is probably the most ex-
pansive of the three; it would allow negotiating parties to waive the
privilege and introduce the statements if desired. Thus, negotiation
statements made between a party and a third party would not be ex-
cluded if the involved party was advocating the admission of these
statements because a privilege may not be asserted by a nonsettling
party.17 However, the court would still have the option to exclude
the evidence if irrelevant.IS
The privilege justification, although the most expansive, is still ar-
guably subject to the many exceptions and loopholes contained
within the rule. This author advocates the use of this policy justifica-
tion because it provides a means for limiting some of rule 408's
exceptions.
II. APPLICATION IN THE COURTS
Some courts have established a liberal interpretation of rule 408.
Other courts, however, have so diluted the rule with exceptions that
they virtually swallow the rule itself. These exceptions include: (1)
the requirement of a dispute; (2) the admissibility of otherwise dis-
coverable evidence; and (3) the allowance of evidence when offered
for another purpose. Although the basis for these exceptions are
contained within the text of the rule,19 some courts have so extended
their application that the policy of encouraging negotiation is being
severely frustrated.
14. West v. Smith, 101 U.S. 263, 273 (1879) (presumed without prejudice); Outlook
Hotel Co. v. St. John, 287 F. 115, 116-17 (3d Cir. 1923). See generally WEINSTEIN's EvI-
DENCE, supra note 3, at 408-21 (discussion of early cases adopting the English rule).
15. In re Evansville Television Inc., 286 F.2d 65, 70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Schepp v. Producers Inc., 366 U.S. 903 (1961) (negotiations conditioned on inad-
missibility); S. Leo Harmonay Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 597 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1985) (use of
"without prejudice" language held conclusive evidence that letter was effort at com-
promise and thus excludable).
16. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 76 (1954).
17. See Esser v. Brophey, 212 Minn. 194, 3 N.W.2d 3 (1942) (court applied privilege
rationale and found defendant waived the exclusion of statements made in negotiation
with a third party). But see Kennon v. Slipstreamer, Inc., 794 F.2d 1067, 1071 (5th Cir.
1986) (evidence favoring settling party held inadmissible for purpose other than liabil-
ity or invalidity of claim when objected to by nonsettling party).
18. This option is limited, because the modern rule of relevancy is very expansive.
See FED. R. EVID. 403. Evidence could also be excluded on prejudicial grounds at the
court's discretion. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
19. See supra note 1 for the full text of the rule.
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A. Liberal Interpretations
Many courts have applied a liberal interpretation of rule 408
merely by citing the general rule of excludability. In Overseas Mo-
tors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd.,20 the court stated that "the exclusion
must extend to all '[e]vidence of conduct or statements made in com-
promise negotiations,' and this encompasses the whole of the settle-
ment evidence."2 1 Similarly, in In re Golden Plan of California,
Inc.,22 the bankruptcy court held that "[i]t is well-settled that state-
ments made during the course of settlement negotiations are
inadmissible."23
These cases follow an expansive reading of rule 408. The impor-
tance of negotiation is emphasized and the availability of the excep-
tions downplayed or ignored. The Ninth Circuit has implemented
this approach. In United States v. Contra Costa County Water Dis-
trict,24 the United States sued the water district for the cost of a re-
taining wall. A settlement with a third party generated $75,000 for
the United States. However, this settlement was offset and resulted
in $30,000 actually being received. The water district requested dis-
closure of the settlement negotiations with the third party so as to
receive the full $75,000 offset in their payment rather than the
$30,000 actually received. The Ninth Circuit, however, summarily
dismissed the requests of the water district, holding that the "general
rule of inadmissibility" mandated exclusion.25 Emphasized were the
public policies favoring out-of-court settlements and the encourage-
ment of open and frank discussion.26
Conversely, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In re Cecchini,27
although affirming the bankruptcy court's declaration of excludabil-
ity, implied that the statements could have been admitted as in-
20. 375 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (action for violation of Sherman Act and
Clayton Act), aff'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
21. Overseas, 325 F. Supp. at 537.
22. 39 Bankr. 551 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984).
23. Id. at 554. The bankruptcy court determined that the trustee had not aban-
doned his interest in the subject property even though a written statement was made
during negotiations that the trustee no longer asserted an interest in the property.
24. 678 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1982).
25. Id. at 92. The court based its decision on Factor v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 100,
125 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961), which also applied a broad inter-
pretation of rule 408.
26. Contra Costa, 678 F.2d at 92. Additionally, the court noted as further support
for exclusion, that the applicant was not a party to the settlement conference. See
supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text for similar analysis in other cases.
27. 37 Bankr. 671 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984).
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dependent statements of fact.28 However, no analysis of the law was
undertaken; thus, the precedent value of this decision is limited.
Another recent bankruptcy case on point is In re Richardson,29
wherein the court determined that, because the offer in question oc-
curred after the court's turnover order, it "had to constitute in some
respect an offer of compromise and settlement which the court can-
not consider ..... 30 A broad interpretation of rule 408, as in the
above cases, promotes settlement negotiations. Although the excep-
tions to the rule are necessary to prevent abuses, these exceptions
cannot be so expanded as to promote abuse of the settlement process.
Another method of extending rule 408 is to include conduct or
statements made in prior related negotiations between the parties, or
in negotiations with third parties, rather than limiting application of
the rule to the parties and issues presently at trial. Many recent cir-
cuit cases espouse this view.
In Fiberglass Insulators, Inc. v. Dupuy,31 the Fourth Circuit held
that statements made by party attorneys during earlier related nego-
tiations were insulated from inclusion under rule 408. The court felt
that attorneys needed "wide latitude" to effectively conduct settle-
ment negotiations.32 Unfortunately, a contrasting disposition oc-
curred in the Sixth Circuit in Trans Union Credit Information Co. v.
Associated Credit Services, Inc. ,33 where the court stated that certain
conduct and statements made during the negotiation meeting may
not be excludable if determined to be unrelated to the negotiation
process.34 This analysis illustrates a tendency by many courts to pro-
28. Id. at 674. At issue was the statement by debtor's counsel in the state court
action that the debt would not be dischargeable in bankruptcy due to the debtor's will-
ful and fraudulent actions. The court determined that the statements were made dur-
ing compromise negotiations but declined to rule on whether the statement was
actually two separate statements, the first being an opinion on dischargeability and the
second an admission as to fraudulent conduct. The plaintiff wanted the alleged second
statement declared inadmissible. The court instead stated that "[t]he trial court may
have incorrectly characterized the testimony. However, any such error was harmless."
Id. The court did not discuss the question of the plaintiff's alleged entitlement to in-
clusion had the statements been declared independent statements of fact.
29. 85 Bankr. 1008 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
30. Id. at 1014 n.13. The plaintiff attempted to establish that the debtor offered
$3500 to purchase a tractor as evidence that the defendant may have had an ability to
pay the money requested in the turnover order.
31. 865 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1988).
32. Id. at 654. The court stated that "the fact that offering an item of evidence is
not in terms barred by Rule 408 does not make it otherwise admissible." Id. at 655.
Finding the earlier negotiations to be all part of the general breakup of the business
association enabled the court to include those statements as arising out of the same
transaction. Id. See WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE supra note 3, 408[4], at 408-27.
33. 805 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1986) (action for specific performance of credit reporting
service agreement).
34. The court, however, determined the statements at issue to be related to the
negotiation process, and thus found them inadmissible. Id. at 192.
S242
[Vol. 16: S237, 1989] Shielding Negotiations Through Rule 408
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tect only those statements which are explicit offers of compromise,
this interpretation may be inconsistent with the rule as enacted.
Rule 408 clearly mandates protection to more than just explicit offers
of compromise. 35 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit appears to have ap-
plied an incorrect interpretation. However, since the Fourth Circuit
case is more recent, this may be indicative of a trend towards a more
liberal interpretation.
A more common scenario is the attempt to introduce settlement
agreements made with third parties. For instance, a nonsettling de-
fendant may wish to include settlements made with other defendants
in hopes of lessening their liability.36 Cases in the federal circuit are
in agreement that this situation must be covered by the rule.37 Non-
settling defendants cannot be provided an advantage which may in
practice encourage litigation rather than settlement.3 8
In Bradbury v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,3 9 the Tenth Circuit went
one step further in determining that prior settlement agreements in
seven similar cases against the defendant were included within the
rule 408 umbrella, because they arose out of the same large scale
transaction as that between the third party and the party to the pres-
ent suit.40 Again, the strong policy of encouraging settlement was
35. See WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 408-3.
36. Note that under the privilege justification, this information would be excluded
because the nonsettling defendant was not a party to the negotiation. The plaintiff, on
the other hand, would have the option of including the negotiation statements. See
supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
37. See Branch v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 783 F.2d 1289, 1294 (5th Cir. 1986) (ad-
missibility at trial of nonsettling defendant, of settlement agreements between plain-
tiffs and settling defendant held to be clear error); McInnis v. A.M.F. Inc., 765 F.2d 240
(1st Cir. 1985) (admission of release obtained by motorist from motorcyclist was preju-
dicial error); McHann v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 713 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1983) (evi-
dence of covenant not to sue between owner of tire and service station which
employed plaintiff was inadmissible); see also Kennon v. Slipstreamer, Inc., 794 F.2d
1067, 1069 (5th Cir. 1986) (even where evidence favors settling party, inadmissible to
prove liability or invalidity of claim); United States v. Contra Costa County Water
Dist., 678 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1982) (court considered evidence especially excludable as
appellant was not a party to settlement negotiations).
38. If a defendant is permitted to introduce evidence of settlements with codefend-
ants, a jury might be easily convinced to reduce the plaintiff's award-a result incon-
sistent with the promotion of settlement.
39. 815 F.2d 1356 (10th Cir. 1987).
40. Id. at 1363. The court based its determination on Weinstein's discussion of the
matter wherein the evidence expert stated that a compromise of a claim "arising out of
the same transaction" was excluded under rule 408. See WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra
note 3, 408[04], at 408-27. However, the evidence was ultimately held admissible
under the other purposes doctrine. Bradbury, 815 F.2d at 1364. See infra notes 55-68
and accompanying text for a discussion of the other purposes doctrine.
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enough to encompass these separate claims.
B. Requirement of Dispute and Intent to Settle
Rule 408 requires the compromise or attempt to compromise to
pertain to a claim disputed as to either validity or amount.41 The
problem arises in determining the point at which a dispute comes
into existence. A number of cases have severely limited the applica-
tion of rule 408 by declaring that a dispute does not exist until for-
mally initiated. For instance, the Ninth Circuit in Cassino v.
Reichhold Ciemicals, Inc.,42 held that rule 408 only applies to ex-
isting disputes. Thus, a general release of potential claims was deter-
mined admissible because the plaintiff had not yet asserted any claim
for relief.43
Similarly in In re B.D. International Discount Group,4 4 the Second
Circuit held that a damaging entry in the debtor's financial state-
ments was not excludable under rule 408. The court, in a footnote,
determined that because the debtor did not dispute the creditor's
claim at the time of the negotiations, but rather simply wanted more
time to pay, no dispute was in existence. 45 No factual support was
provided for this conclusion.
Information obtained from accounting firms hired for an examina-
tion of the debtor's finances has also been determined to be uncov-
ered by rule 408. In SEC v. Touche Ross & Co.,46 the district court
held that the nature of the accounting firm's retainer by the creditor
was not to engage in compromise negotiations, but rather to engage
in conduct more akin to an arbitrator or expert appraiser. The sole
purpose was to ascertain facts to support a cause of action and not to
compromise or settle any such claims.
This line of reasoning was also adopted by the Seventh Circuit in
General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Association,47
where the court determined that statements made in a telephone call
were admissible because the intent of the call was not to settle or
compromise a claim. Thus, even though the telephone call was fol-
lowed by a settlement proposal, the call was held to be admissible.48
Although rule 408 is intended to cover more than just explicit offers
41. See FED. R. EVID. 408; see also supra note 1 (complete text of rule).
42. 817 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1987) (discriminatory termination of employment).
43. Id. at 1342-43.
44. 701 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1983).
45. Id. at 1074 n.5. The court provided no factual support for its determination
that, at that time of the negotiation, the claim was undisputed. However, even re-
questing more time to pay a debt should give rise to coverage under rule 408 because it
can significantly affect the amount of the claim by changing its present value.
46. 438 F. Supp. 259, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
47. 830 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1987) (antitrust case).
48. Id at 724. The settlement proposal, however, was not admitted into evidence.
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of compromise, it is difficult to delineate a specific time when a dis-
pute comes into existence. Thus, in a case decided the same year, the
same circuit reached a different conclusion with regard to two letters
sent by the plaintiff to the defendant.49 The court adopted plaintiff's
argument that the letters involved feelings, comments, opinions, and
recommendations for settlement, even though there was no formal
dispute or intent to settle in existence at the time of the writing.5 0
Settlement negotiations are frequently undertaken prior to the ini-
tiation of a formal dispute. By restricting rule 408 to statements
made after a formal complaint filing, early casual settlement is signif-
icantly jeopardized. Indeed, one of the main justifications for imple-
menting the rule was to extend coverage beyond explicit offers of
compromise in order to protect the entire settlement environment.51
This cannot be satisfactorily achieved without including negotiations
occurring prior to formal dispute initiation.
C Information Otherwise Discoverable
The amended version of the rule, passed by Congress in 1975,
clearly and correctly provides an exception for otherwise discovera-
ble evidence. The rule is applied only where the document or state-
ment would not have existed but for the negotiations.52 Additionally,
rule 408 is intended to restrict admissibility of settlement negotia-
tions at trial, but does not affect a party's right to discovery proceed-
ings.53 Negotiations cannot be "used as a device to thwart discovery
by making existing documents unreachable." The policy of liberal
discovery must exist in concert with settlement encouragement.
This case can be construed to be incorrect, because rule 408 is intended to cover more
than just explicit offers of compromise.
49. Kritikos v. Palmer Johnson, Inc., 821 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1987) (delay in con-
struction of yacht).
50. Id. at 423. The court based its holdings on the policy favoring the encourage-
ment of settlement discussions.
51. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text. See generally THE CENTER FOR
PUBLIC RESOURCES, CONTAINING LEGAL COSTS: ADR STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATIONS,
LAW FIRMS, AND GOVERNMENT 18-20 (1988) (discussion of rule 408 justifications).
52. Ramada Dev. Co. v. Rauch, 644 F.2d 1097, 1107 (5th Cir. 1981).
53. In re Contemporary Mission, Inc., 44 B.R. 940 (D. Conn. 1984) (motion to com-
pel answers to interrogatories granted); see also WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE supra note 3,
408(01], at 408-16 ("not intended to conflict with the liberal rules of discovery embodied
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure").
54. Ramada, 644 F.2d at 1107; see also In re B.D. Int'l Discount Corp., 701 F.2d at
1073 (statement in financial records is admissible even though presented during negoti-
ations because information was otherwise discoverable). See generally S. REP. No.
1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974).
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D. Other Purposes Doctrine
The most potentially abused of the exceptions is the other purposes
doctrine contained in the last sentence of the rule.55 In certain sce-
narios, the necessity of this exception is clear; in other cases, courts
will search for another purpose in order to include helpful evidence,
thus jeopardizing the settlement process. The trial judge should
carefully weigh the need for such evidence against the potential for
discouraging future settlement negotiations. When the evidence is
merely corroborative, admission must not be allowed.56 The Eighth
Circuit in National Battery Co. v. Levy57 makes clear that if any
other proof is available, exclusion must be upheld. Furthermore,
when the issue is doubtful, the policy of exclusion should override. 58
The last sentence of rule 408 was drafted in a very open-ended
fashion. Because of this, the other purposes doctrine has the poten-
tial to completely override the policies of settlement negotiation.
However, the law is not completely devoid of direction. In fact, the
rule itself contains examples where the other purposes doctrine is to
come into effect. Although these are not intended to be exhaustive,
all of the examples cited relate to either rebutting an allegation or
attacking credibility in some form.59 Thus, this author submits that
the other purposes doctrine should be limited to those contexts, or at
the very least, that any other scenario be confronted with a height-
ened scrutiny requirement. 60
Examples of other purposes which have been allowed in various
courts include: (1) showing the relationship between the parties;61
(2) attacking credibility of witnesses or parties;62 (3) proving a party's
understanding of obligations under an agreement;63 (4) determining
55. See supra note 1 for text of rule.
56. National Battery Co. v. Levy, 126 F.2d 33, 36-37 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
697 (1942) (where other uncontroverted proof available, evidence is merely corrobora-
tive and thus inadmissible).
57. Id.
58. Bradbury v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 815 F.2d 1356, 1364 (10th Cir. 1987) (tres-
pass, assault, and outrageous conduct action).
59. See supra note 1 for text of rule.
60. See Bradbury, 815 F.2d at 1364 ("[W]hen the issue is doubtful, the better prac-
tice is to exclude evidence of compromises or compromise offers ... ").
61. Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1292-93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1101 (1985) (indemnity agreement properly admitted to show relationship of par-
ties and to attack credibility of witnesses).
62. Id.; County of Hennepin v. AFG Industries, Inc., 726 F.2d 149, 152-53 (8th Cir.
1984) (properly admitted to impeach testimony of plaintiff's witness); United States v.
Gilbert, 668 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982) (earlier consent de-
cree admissible to prove defendant's knowledge of SEC's reporting requirements).
63. Bituminous Constr., Inc. v. Rucker Enters., Inc., 816 F.2d 965, 968-69 (4th Cir.
1987) (in action for fraud and breach of contract, court properly exercised discretion in
admitting letters discussing settlement negotiations to show defendant's understanding
of his obligations under the agreement); United States v. Wilford, 710 F.2d 439, 450.51
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whether a plaintiff has failed to mitigate damages;6 4 and (5) avoiding
jury confusion. 65 Attacking credibility and defending a failure to mit-
igate allegation are seemingly contemplated by the other purposes
doctrine.6 6 However, even in these areas, the judge should guard
against needless concern over issues which unnecessarily undercut
the rule against inclusion. Conversely, application in other contexts
does not seem to be specifically contemplated by Congress and thus a
heightened scrutiny should apply. Under Bradbury v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co.,67 "when the issue is doubtful, the better practice is to ex-
clude [the] evidence 6.... 8
Evidence should be admitted to prevent abuse of the negotiation
practice when bad bargaining tactics are in question.69 Although this
situation is not specifically mentioned, the policy of rule 408 is to pre-
vent, not encourage, abuse. In line with this policy, a mere allegation
of improper bargaining should not be enough to allow admission of
settlement conduct.70
IV. THE OPTIMUM BALANCE
Presently, there is no consensus in the federal courts regarding
what constitutes the optimum balance. However, increased court
congestion can only be prevented by mailitaining a high level of set-
(8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984) (settlement offered to show circum-
stances surrounding refunds).
64. Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082, 1103 (5th Cir. 1987)
(violation of Equal Credit Opportunity Act); Urico v. Parnell Oil Co., 708 F.2d 852 (1st
Cir. 1983) (negotiation evidence admissible to show defendant unreasonably prevented
plaintiff from mitigating damages).
65. Kennon v. Slipstreamer, Inc., 794 F.2d 1067, 1070 (5th Cir. 1986) (disclosingfact
that other defendants had settled with plaintiff acceptable to quell jury confusion but
disclosure of amount of settlement held a violation); accord Belton v. Fibreboard
Corp., 724 F.2d 500, 504-05 (5th Cir. 1984); MCI Communications v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
66. These situations either concern credibility or involve rebutting an allegation
made at trial. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
67. 815 F.2d 1356 (10th Cir. 1987).
68. Id. at 1364.
69. In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 870 (1979) (conduct of negotiations relevant in class action where
fairness of settlement was basis of appeal); In re Grant Broadcasting, 71 Bankr. 376
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (extending General Motors, court allowed conduct of debtor's
officers to develop any possible evidence of collusion or bad bargaining even though no
impropriety was alleged in proceeding).
70. It is easy to see how such an extension could lead to considerable abuse. But
see In re Grant Broadcasting, 71 Bankr. 376, 390 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (court decided
"close evidentiary issue" and allowed evidence to come in even though no allegation of
impropriety).
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tlement probability. A high level of settlement probability can only
be achieved if the rules of evidence are strictly adhered to. This, of
course, does not mean that rule 408 should be devoid of exceptions.
A trial judge must be acutely aware of the effect of loophole expan-
sion on later settlement proceedings both within the case itself, as
well as in the context of later cases once precedent is set.
Viewing the right to withhold settlement information as a rule of
privilege helps to lessen the judge's role of prejudicial balancing.
Under the rule of privilege, the evidence simply should not come in
unless it was offered in the settlement context, or unless the infor-
mation is otherwise obtainable or being used for another purpose.
With regard to the requirement of a dispute, a formal initiation re-
quirement seems inappropriate, as settlement can often occur; settle-
ment should be encouraged to develop prior to such initiation.
However, evidence of an intent to settle is more reasonable. The pol-
icy of encouraging compromise is not undermined by the inclusion of
evidence which was not offered with settlement in mind. Caution
should be exercised, though, to exclude all statements and conduct
surrounding the settlement so as to not limit the rule's applicability
only to express offers of compromise.
The otherwise discoverable limitation is necessary to prevent abuse
of the discovery process. The liberal rules of discovery mandate that
documents cannot be determined unreachable simply because they
have been mentioned in the settlement context. A rule to the con-
trary would easily lead to considerable abuse.
In contrast, the other purposes doctrine is not so easily defended.
Although the author would agree that some information obtained
during settlement must necessarily be heard, when the evidence
could also be used for determining the liability and/or validity of a
claim, a strong presumption of exclusion should apply. Particularly
when a jury is employed, the prejudicial impact of such evidence far
outweighs the benefits of inclusion unless no other evidence will suf-
ficiently support the other purpose. The privilege of exclusion
should thus extend to all information which could be used to prove
liability or validity of a claim unless offered for another valid purpose
and no other evidence is available.
With regard to the requirement of a valid other purpose, more def-
erence needs to be given to the suggested direction in the rule itself.
Congress's main concern appears to be abuse related. Thus, if credi-
bility is at issue, the doctrine should be applied. Similarly, a party
cannot be permitted to use the protection of settlement negotiation
in order to leave its opponent without a defense to d trial allegation.
In fact, bad faith in general should rise to admissibility, since the rule
was not intended to protect bad faith negotiations. However, situa-
S248
[Vol. 16: S237, 1989] Shielding Negotiations Through Rule 408
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tions outside of these scenarios should be subjected to a heightened
scrutiny requirement, because they were not specifically contem-
plated by Congress in enacting rule 408.
By maintaining these strict guidelines, attorneys will not be dis-
suaded from offering settlement proposals and many litigation ex-
penses may be properly avoided. The optimum balance can thus be
achieved.
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